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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the channels through which innovations to policy variables—
policy rates or monetary aggregates—affect such macroeconomic variables as output and 
inflation in Sri Lanka. The effectiveness of monetary policy instruments is judged through 
the prism of conventional policy channels (money/interest rate, bank lending, exchange rate 
and asset price channels) in VAR models. The timing and magnitude of these effects are 
assessed using impulse response functions, and through the pass-through coefficients from 
policy to money market and lending rates. Our results show that (i) the interest rate channel 
(money view) has the strongest Granger effect (helps predict) on output with a 0.6 percent 
decrease in output after the second quarter and a cumulative 0.5 percent decline within a  
three-year period in response to innovations in the policy rate; (ii) the contribution from the 
bank lending channel is statistically significant (adding 0.2 percentage point to the baseline 
effect of policy rates) in affecting both output and prices but with a lag of about five 
quarters for output and longer for prices; and (iii) the exchange rate and asset price channels 
are ineffective and do not have Granger effects on either output or prices. 
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I.   BACKGROUND 
Recent experience with monetary policy easing in Sri Lanka has focused attention on the 
efficacy of monetary transmission channels. Emphasis has been put on a more accommodative 
monetary stance to support growth. However, there has been a slow pass-through from policy 
rates to lending rates, and private credit growth has steadily declined. In this context, it is 
important to determine if adjustments to monetary policy instruments are impacting 
macroeconomic variables such as aggregate output and prices. Questions arise on two fronts: (i) 
which transmission channels or combination of channels (money/interest rate, bank lending, 
exchange rate, asset price channels) are likely to be the most effective in transmitting policy 
changes to output and prices; and (ii) what is the timing and magnitude of the effects of policy 
changes on macroeconomic variables given the strength of the transmission mechanism.     
In this paper, we build on previous work (Annex II) and investigate monetary transmission 
mechanisms in Sri Lanka and discuss possible policy ramifications.  We adopt the following 
approach.  
 Section II provides the literature review. Section III examines the first steps in the 
transmission mechanism—relating changes in the policy rate to changes in money 
market and lending and deposit rates.2 Section IV discusses the data and empirical 
strategy. Section V assesses the role of each channel by using a Vector Autoregressive 
(VAR) model which includes a specific variable for that channel. For example, to assess 
the role of the bank lending channel, the stock of bank credit or the bank lending rate is 
among the endogenous variables in the VAR. The significance (and timing effects) is 
tested both in a Granger causality setup and through impulse response functions (IRF).3  
 Section VI adopts an alternative simulation by comparing IRFs for two models of 
monetary policy impact on output and prices. In one model, each channel of monetary 
transmission is permitted to respond endogenously to a monetary policy shock. In the 
other, the monetary transmission mechanism is treated as an exogenous variable.4 The 
difference between the two IRFs provides a measure of the quantitative strength of each 
transmission channel.  
 Section VII uses  an eight-variable VAR model  to try to explain the scope of the bank 
lending channel in neutralizing the policy signals on output and the role of  Treasury bill 
rates in inflation formation.  
 Section VIII concludes with a brief discussion of policy implications. 
The main results of this exercise are as follows: (i) no other channel is as strong as the interest 
                                                 
2 Mishra, Montiel and Spilimbergo (2010), and Mishra and Montiel (2012).  
3 Augmented by Toda and Yamamato (1995) technique to accommodate uncertainty about the correct order of 
integration.  
4 Ramey (1993); Disyatat and Vongsinsirkul (2003). 
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rate channel in Sri Lanka. In particular (i) the exchange rate and asset price channels are 
ineffective and do not have Granger effects on either output or prices owing to limited 
movements in the exchange rate, and to limited foreign ownership and less active equity market 
financing for borrowers in the case of the asset price channel; (ii) the bank lending channel has 
an impact on output but with a lag of about 5 quarters; and (iii) on its impact on inflation, the 
bank lending channel is effective within about 5–10 quarters. 
II.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
Where does the literature on monetary policy transmission stand? Transmission of monetary 
policy actions to the real economy and the role of distributional effects of various channels (the 
interest rate, the credit, the exchange rate, and the asset price channels (Mishkin, 1996)) has 
been a central question in both academia and policy making. Looking into the advancements in 
research in recent years, one can already see how close to unveiling this “black box” are the 
efforts of a large body of theoretical literature and a plethora of empirical papers. If previously 
many studies focused on the interest rate channel, the bank lending and asset price channels are 
also playing more important roles and are becoming widely studied (Bernanke (1993a, b), 
Gertler and Gilchrist (1993), Kashyap and Stein (1994), and Hubbard (1995)).  
 
The academic and empirical literature can be studied in several dimensions. First, there is the 
debate based on evidence from advanced countries on the importance of monetary policy in 
affecting the real economy and on transmission channels including the latest merits for the bank 
lending channel. Second are such questions as whether the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism is different in low- income countries (LICs); whether the effectiveness of various 
channels is weaker in LICs; and why. Third, the debates (especially for developing and low-
income countries) focus on the methodological issues  of how best to capture the evidence 
related to the effectiveness of monetary policy innovations including the identification of shocks 
and exploring the transmission channels.  
 
The interest rate channel through which policy innovations affect output and prices has  been 
traditionally viewed as the main channel and was studied through the prism of IS/LM and VAR 
models (Sims, 1972; Christiano and others (1999)). Debates remain about precisely what factor 
or combination of factors account for this real effect, where innovations in policy rates affect 
output with the lead candidates being sticky prices, sticky wages, and imperfect competition. 
However, what is clear is that changes in policy rates are important only insofar as they affect 
aggregate outcomes through private investment and with no distributional effects on economic 
agents (Cecchetti (1995); and Grilli and Roubini (1995)). In addition, the credit view, or bank 
lending channel, focuses on the distributional consequences of monetary policy distinguishing 
the policy impact on individual agents’ creditworthiness from the feasibility of investment 
projects.  The exchange rate channel is examined in the context of emerging markets and low-
income economies (Cushman and Zha (1995)). The studies offering an explicit account for asset 
prices in the monetary policy reaction function are as follows: Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 
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(1994); Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997); Gilchrist and Saito (2006); Airaudo, Nisticò and Zanna 
(2012); and Pfajfar and Santoro (2007). 
 
The literature on monetary policy takes into account fundamental differences in the financial, 
economic, and institutional structures of advanced, emerging, and low- income economies. 
Although banks are dominant formal financial intermediaries in developing countries, the 
formal financial system tends to be very small relative to the size of the economy. In addition, 
these countries have imperfect links with the private international capital markets and their 
central banks intervene heavily in foreign exchange markets (Mishra  and others (2010), Mishra 
and Montiel (2012)). Aside from traditional VAR models used in identifying the impact of 
monetary policy shocks on the real economy in advanced countries, in a cross- country context, 
and, in particular, for low- and middle- income countries, the literature on methodology has 
mainly focused on (i) identifying the intermediate targets of monetary policy; (ii) identifying the 
exogenous monetary policy shocks (correct ordering of impact and affected variables and 
relevant decompositions (i.e, Choleski, simultaneous identifications); and (iii) exploring the 
channels of transmission with VAR and “exogenous tests” simulation approaches (Ramey, 
1993).  
 
Prior work on the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission for developing countries in 
Asia is scarce. Agha and others (2005) investigate the monetary policy in Pakistan by adopting 
Ramey’s (1993) approach together with their own system of four variable recursive VARs (see 
Section VI). Later, Alam and Waheed (2006) also used recursive VARs both at the aggregate 
and  sectoral levels for Pakistan. Mallick (2009) investigated monetary policy transmission in 
India using a five- variable VAR by applying both recursive and structural identification 
schemes. Ahmad (2008) used a VAR framework with a recursive Sims ordering of monetary 
policy and macroeconomic variables for Fiji and Papua New Guinea. Yang and others (2011) 
studied the monetary policy transmission mechanisms in Pacific islands in the context of the 
global financial crisis using autoregressive distributed lags (ADL) model. Work on Sri Lanka 
includes Perera and Wickramanayake (2013) and Vinayagathasan (2013). We compare our work 
with prior investigations done for Sri Lanka in Annex II. 
 
III.   CURRENT CHALLENGES 
Identifying the intermediate target of monetary policy has evolved to be more transparent 
though interventions in the foreign exchange market made the range of policy tools wider. The 
choice of the intermediate target of the monetary policy by the CBSL has narrowed to a 
monetary aggregate (with reserve money serving as the operating target) with the main policy 
instruments being (a) policy interest rates (interest rates on overnight repurchase and reverse 
repurchase agreements) and open market operations (OMO) and (b) the statutory reserve 
requirement (SRR) on commercial bank deposit liabilities (Central Bank of Sri Lanka, 2013). 
Although not defined formally, foreign exchange operations and liquidity management 
associated with the issuance of international bonds have also indirectly became part of monetary 
policy tools. 
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Banks are the dominant financial intermediaries in Sri Lanka. This suggests that the bank 
lending channel should be the main vehicle for monetary policy transmission. However, 
rigidities limit the effectiveness of bank lending in servicing the economy’s demand for capital. 
The core problem (highlighted both by the monetary authorities and empirical studies) is 
imperfect links between policy rates and domestic and international capital markets. The 
decision-making process by private agents is confounded by imperfect signals in the term 
structure of interest rates and in the money and capital markets. Also, a lack of competition 
inhibits the effectiveness of the bank lending channel. The following factors are particularly 
important: 
 The presence of “excess liquidity” can interfere with monetary policy transmission. 
Excess liquidity hinders the pass-through from policy rate adjustments to bank lending 
because the marginal increase in the policy rate may not be effective in forcing banks to 
raise their lending rates. In Sri Lanka, the ratio of bank loans to GDP has not changed 
significantly during the last 15 years (the average has remained close to 25 percent over 
time) though the post-conflict average ratio is slightly higher reaching 27 percent (Figure 
1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
Figure 1. Sri Lanka: Ratio of Bank Loans to GDP 
(In percent)
Sri Lanka Linear (Sri Lanka)
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka. 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
Bank loans
Securities holdings
Repo rate
MMR
Figure 2. Sri Lanka: Selected Financial Indicators
Millions 
of rupees
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka.
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
-200
-150
-100
-50
0
50
100
150
200
250
Change in Bank Loans
Change in Securities Holdings
Change in Repo Rate
Figure 4. Sri Lanka: Selected Financial Indicators
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Figure 3. Sri Lanka: Banks' Liquid Asset Holdings
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 Banks’ asset composition has shifted from loans to liquid assets (securities) hindering an 
effective response from the banking sector to monetary policy signals (Figures 2, 3, and 
4). Over time, Banks’ composition of assets has shifted toward holding government 
securities. This situation can also be described as one of “excess liquidity” insofar as 
banks (owing to moral suasion and a guaranteed rate of return rather than assuming the 
risk of new assets) choose not to lend at higher rates and instead maintain higher levels 
of securities. The main contributing factor for this recently has been the lack of private 
sector demand for loans. Figure 4 shows that the change in securities holdings prevails 
even after changes in the policy 
rate.  
 Only significant increases in policy 
rates that would also upwardly 
adjust the money market and bond 
yields would require the banks to 
revert to financing themselves with 
deposits and to increase deposit 
rates. This is also evidenced with 
banks increasingly using other 
forms of funding—bond market and 
foreign borrowing. Figure 5 shows 
that the share of deposits has not 
much increased in the last 15 years while the share of demand deposits in total deposits 
has significantly declined recently.  
 There is a weak correlation between central bank policy actions and money market and 
bank lending and deposit rates in Sri Lanka.5  Both money market and lending and 
deposit rates react slowly to policy changes, thus hindering an effective transmission 
mechanism (Tables 1a and 1b and Table 2). 6,7 For example, an increase in the policy rate 
                                                 
5 Given the high volatility in call money market rates, there is lower correlation with prime lending rates and the 
correlation tends to increase when an alternative money market rate, for example, 3-month Treasury bill rate, is 
used. In fact, interest rate pass-through is higher when prime rates and Treasury bill rates are considered. 
Acknowledging the existence of these intermittent volatilities, our main concern, however, is that generally the 
impact of policy rates on money market and bank rates is weak. 
6 Following Mishra and Montiel (2012), we calculated the speed and magnitude of pass-through from policy rates 
to money market and lending rates as follows: 
Yit=αyit-1+βyit-2+ϒxit+δxit-1+ηxit-2+εit 
Where y is the change in the affected rate and x the change in the impact rate. The short-run effect is measured with 
ϒ and the  long- run impact by (ϒ+ δ+ η)/(1- α- β). Contemporaneous correlations are in the first column of Tables 
1, 2, and 3. Coefficients in the tables show the pass-through from a one percentage point change in impact rates to 
affected rates.  We analyze both the pass-through of changes in policy rates to money market rates and the pass-
through from money market rates to lending and deposit rates. 
7 In Table 1b, we recalculated both contemporaneous and longer-term correlations of money market rates following 
changes in money market repo rates in lieu of policy repo rates to accommodate the possibility that money market 
repo rates carry more information about policy innovations. We find those correlations even weaker and thus our 
(continued…) 
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by one percentage point increases the money market rate by only 0.35 percentage point, 
and an increase in the money market rate by one percentage point increases lending and 
deposit rates by only 0.68 and 0.19 percentage point, respectively. By contrast, in 
Malaysia an increase in the policy rate by one percentage point increases the money 
market rate by about 0.94 percentage point, and an increase in the money market rate by 
one percentage point increases lending and deposit rates by 0.96 and 0.98 percentage 
point, respectively. However, the longer-term effects of policy changes on lending rates 
can be more significant in Sri Lanka, because the spread narrows over time (Figure 6).  
 The impact of policy and money market rates on long-term bond yields is weak8. We 
have also calculated both contemporaneous and longer-term effects of policy and money 
market rates on bond yields for 3, 5, and 10-year maturities (Table 3). Results show that 
there is some perverse contemporaneous relationship between the policy rates and bond 
yields although this dissipates when using the money market repo rate (see Footnote 6). 
Regardless of the definition of repo rates, there is only a long-run meaningful impact of 
policy and money market rates on bond yields.  
 
                                                                                                                                                            
baseline inference did not change. In addition, the longer-term impact of money market repo rates on bond yields is 
much weaker compared to the effects of policy repo rate (Table 3).  
8 The relationship between policy rates and long-term government bond yields can be further influenced by other 
factors including inflation expectations and the market conditions for the government bonds. 
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Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term
Change in repo rate Change in repo rate
Change in call market rate Change in call market rate
0.4343 2.5904 1.5013 0.0739 0.1989 0.6556
Change in repo rate Change in repo rate
Change in WALR 1/ Change in WALR 2/
0.5515 0.8300 1.1278 0.8838 0.5178 1.1988
Change in repo rate Change in repo rate
Change in prime lending rate Change in prime lending rate
0.6565 1.3707 1.1339 0.4683 0.7779 1.1431
Change in repo rate Change in repo rate
Change in 3 month T bill Change in 3 month T bill
0.6198 0.7358 0.9649 0.3890 0.5111 1.1735
Change in repo rate Change in repo rate
Change in 6 month T bill Change in 6 month T bill
0.6265 0.7586 0.9390 0.5167 0.6527 1.1977
Change in repo rate Change in repo rate
Change in 12 month T bill Change in 12 month T bill
0.6290 0.5005 0.9369 0.5336 0.6368 1.1952
Change in repo rate Change in repo rate
Change in deposit rate Change in deposit rate
0.3852 0.2063 0.8416 0.3351 0.0611 0.7065
Source: IMF staff estimates. Source: IMF staff estimates.
1/ Weighted average lending rate. 1/ Market repo rate is used for policy rate. 
     Data are available from 2004:3.
2/ Weighted average lending rate.
Table 1a. Sri Lanka: Correlations Between 
Changes in Repo Rate and Changes in 
Money Market and Securities Returns
Table 1b. Sri Lanka: Correlations Between 
Changes in Repo Rate and Changes in 
Money Market and Securities Returns 1/
11 
 
 There have been significant shifts recently 
in the pass-through from policy rates to 
money market rates and lending 
and deposit rates in Sri Lanka 
(Figures 7 and 8). The impact 
of money market rates on the 
spread between the lending and 
deposit rates has also been 
magnified recently.  This only 
confirms our earlier observation 
that, although eventually, the 
money market rates might 
move the lending rate, the 
change in the deposit rate is 
negligible as banks have 
abundant excess liquidity to 
counteract the policy change 
and have no short-term funding 
needs (Figures 9 and 10).  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
01
/0
2/
12
03
/0
2/
12
05
/0
2/
12
07
/0
2/
12
09
/0
2/
12
11
/0
2/
12
01
/0
2/
13
03
/0
2/
13
05
/0
2/
13
07
/0
2/
13
09
/0
2/
13
11
/0
2/
13
01
/0
2/
14
03
/0
2/
14
repo prime lending rate
Figure 6. Sri Lanka: Repo and Prime Lending Rates
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Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term
Change in call market rate
Change in prime rate
0.5915 0.4079 0.7449
Change in call market rate
Change in WALR 1/
0.1989 0.1493 0.8240
Change in call market rate
Change in deposit rate
0.0968 0.0228 0.3010
Source: IMF staff estimates.
1/ Weighted average lending rate
Table 2. Sri Lanka: Correlations Between 
Changes in the Money Market Rates 
and Changes in the Lending and Deposit Rates
Repo rate and bond rates
3 year 5 year 10 year
Contemporaneous 0.7197 -0.0262 -0.0398
Short-term effects 2.3665 1.7195 1.5991
Long-term effects 2.7527 2.2041 1.7484
Market repo rate and bond rates
3 year 5 year 10 year
Contemporaneous 0.5444 0.5176 0.4122
Short-term effects 0.8861 0.6587 0.4188
Long-term effects 1.1992 0.9441 0.7022
Call market and bond rates
3 year 5 year 10 year
Contemporaneous 0.5708 0.5347 0.4511
Short-term effects 0.5362 0.4343 0.3354
Long-term effects 0.7649 0.7099 0.4241
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Table 3. Sri Lanka: Impact of Policy and Money 
Market Rates on Long-term Domestic Rates
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 In a cross-country perspective, the weak contemporaneous impact of monetary policy 
adjustments is striking (Table 4 and Table 5).  Looking at the ASEAN-4 countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand), and India and Vietnam, it is evident 
that in almost  all cases (excluding India), the contemporaneous responses of market and 
lending rates to policy changes are very high; however, for all rates the coefficients of 
pass-through for Sri Lanka are below average. Another interesting observation is that in 
all comparator countries, most of the pass-through from changes in the policy rates 
occurs contemporaneously, and then the impact fades away. In Sri Lanka the opposite 
appears true—the longer effects dominate.   
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Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term
Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate
Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate
0.5265 1.7019 1.2082 0.8336 1.4617 1.1907 0.9905 0.7196 1.0067 0.6580 0.4204 0.3201 0.7521 1.0759 0.9314
Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate
Change in 3 month T bill Change in 3 month T bill Change in 3 month T bill Change in 3 month T bill Change in 3 month T bill Change in 3 month T bill Change in 3 month T bill
0.7843 0.6396 1.0430 0.8360 0.1867 0.2403 0.9390 0.7937 0.9856 0.7272 0.0225 0.4650 0.9835 0.7249 0.9971 0.4119 0.5218 0.4387 0.7803 0.4815 0.6949
Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate
Change in 6 month T bill Change in 6 month T bill Change in 6 month T bill Change in 6 month T bill Change in 6 month T bill Change in 6 month T bill Change in 6 month T bill
0.9222 1.5566 1.1637 0.7570 1.1999 0.9127 0.9489 1.2848 1.1729 0.8489 2.3765 1.0747 0.9943 0.8536 0.9875 0.8942 1.4543 1.0623
Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate
Change in 12 month T bill Change in 12 month T bill Change in 12 month T bill Change in 12 month T bill Change in 12 month T bill Change in 12 month T bill Change in 12 month T bill
0.8167 0.5655 0.9777 0.8643 1.5358 1.2294 0.9239 2.7643 1.7389 0.9926 2.8410 2.7922 0.8994 1.9267 1.6846
Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate Change in repo rate
Change in deposit rate Change in deposit rate Change in deposit rate Change in deposit rate Change in deposit rate Change in deposit rate Change in deposit rate
0.5862 0.1854 0.6772 0.8865 0.4185 1.2896 0.9033 0.7422 0.7478 0.8856 -0.1239 -0.0040 0.2919 0.2602 0.4544 0.7133 0.4913 0.2466 0.7111 0.3289 0.5686
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term Contemporaneous Short-term Long-term
Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate
Change in prime lending rate Change in prime lending rate Change in prime lending rate Change in prime lending rate Change in prime lending rate Change in prime lending rate Change in prime lending rate
0.6578 0.0368 0.1491 0.9709 0.6320 0.6740 0.4983 0.0112 -0.0311 0.7090 0.2267 0.2640
Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate
Change in WALR 2/ Change in WALR Change in WALR Change in WALR Change in WALR Change in WALR Change in WALR
0.9193 0.2113 0.3437 0.8869 0.6061 0.7103 0.4341 -0.0253 0.0917 0.7468 0.2641 0.3819
Change in money market rate Change in money market rate Change in money market rate Change in money market rate Change in money market rate Change in money market rate Change in money market rate
Change in WALR Change in WALR Change in WALR Change in WALR Change in WALR Change in WALR Change in WALR
0.8898 0.6111 0.7124 0.9247 0.3246 0.9117 0.6918 0.3356 0.4642 0.8355 0.4237 0.6961
Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate Change in call market rate
Change in deposit rate Change in deposit rate Change in deposit rate Change in deposit rate Change in deposit rate Change in deposit rate Change in deposit rate
0.5740 0.0384 0.2565 0.8933 0.1890 0.6814 0.9791 0.8171 0.8558 0.4102 -0.0892 -0.0418 0.7142 0.2389 0.4380
1/ Data for Indonesia are not available.
2/ Weighted average lending rate
Source: IMF staff estimates.
Vietnam AverageIndia Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Thailand
Table 5. Selected Asian Countries: Correlations Between Changes in the Money Market Rates and Changes in the Lending and Deposit Rates 1/ 
Table 4. Selected Asian Countries: Correlations Between Changes in the Repo Rate and Changes in Money Market and Securities Returns
AverageVietnamThailandPhilippinesMalaysiaIndonesiaIndia
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IV.   DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A.   Data Inspection Strategy 
We use quarterly seasonally adjusted data from 2000Q1 to 2013Q3. Quarterly data are capable 
of producing reasonable sample sizes based on relatively short time spans.  Also, quarterly data 
have become increasingly appealing for the purposes of multivariate inference and testing of 
hypotheses. Using quarterly data avoids possible qualification of the results to which studies 
using monthly GDP data can be subject. For example, quarterly data have a higher signal to 
noise ratio. All variables are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) International 
Financial Statistics (IFS). The summary statistics for key model variables are presented in Table 
1 (Annex I). The data are expressed in natural logarithms(except interest rates, which are in 
level form) and are seasonally adjusted by multiplicative and additive MA (moving average) or 
AR (autoregressive) terms. Knowing the pitfalls arising from using seasonally adjusted data, 
such as the loss of information from automatic detrending, seasonal dummy variables, whenever 
seasonality was observed, are added to the models describing the series as in Table 1, Annex 1.9 
Since there are no theoretical grounds for preferring one form of seasonality or another, the 
choice of series has also been determined in light of information pertaining to the Sri Lankan 
economy. 
 
In characterizing relationships between output, prices, and policy-related variables, stationarity 
properties of the data are important. Equally important is making the correct assumption about 
the true data generating process (DGP). If the data are I (1), the macroeconomic variables should 
be modeled as unit root processes; nonetheless there is some uncertainty regarding the order of 
integration in achieving stationarity. In a trend stationary process (TSP) the effects of shocks 
disappear in the long run when t moves farther away from the moment of the shock. With 
differenced stationary process (DSP) the effect of the shock remains. Making an error in the 
determination of the DGP could lead to wrong inferences. 
 
Data pre-testing and appropriate handling of trends and stationarity are highly stressed by the 
academic literature to arrive at more reliable estimation techniques, including obtaining correct 
estimation equations.10  If some of the variables are stationary and others are nonstationary, the 
latter should be incorporated into the VAR in first-differences to avoid problems of spurious 
correlation. However, in relatively short time series, traditional unit root tests—for example, 
Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) and Phillips–Perron (PP)—have little power to distinguish 
between unit roots and stationary series that are mean-reverting but do so slowly. Hence, these 
tests are biased toward nonrejection of unit roots for short time series (Dejong and others, 1992). 
With 54 quarterly observations at hand this issue is relevant for this study. Although first-
                                                 
9 See Franses (1991). 
10 See, for example, Nelson and Kang (1981), Hafer and Kutan (1997), and Boschen and Mills (1992). 
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differencing all variables guards against the possibility of mishandling a nonstationary variable, 
Christiano and Ljungqvist (1988) demonstrate that series should not be differenced 
unnecessarily because of the low power of time-series tests on growth variables. Also, missing 
the presence of structural breaks in the data can lead to wrong conclusions regarding the unit 
root process for a series (Perron, 1989). This bias may be relevant if dramatic events occur 
during the sample period under study, that is, the 2008–09 global financial crisis. 
 
The strategy for inspecting data is as follows: First, based on the initial data inspection and on 
the behavior of autocorrelation functions, possible equations of DGP describing the series are 
selected. This also assumes the selection of appropriate lag lengths and seasonal dummy 
variables. When misspecification errors are detected, the equations for DGP are  respecified. For 
example, if the Chow test suggests a structural break, then P-break tests are conducted further 
including appropriate dummies for possible break dates in equations of the DGP describing the 
series (Annex I, Table 2). Second, when the relatively reliable equation of DGP describing the 
series is selected, based on AIC (Akaike Information Criterion), SBC (Schwarz's Bayesian 
Criterion), the lowest SSR (Sum of Squared Residuals), and the Q statistics for the 
autocorrelation of the residuals, the unit root tests are conducted on these “true” equations 
describing the DGP of the series. Conclusions regarding whether the series should be 
differenced in the baseline VAR model are reported in Annex I, Table 3. 
 
B.   Methodology  
The standard methodology proposed by Sims (1972) in using Granger causality is followed to 
describe the relationship between monetary policy variables and both output and prices in Sri 
Lanka, where policy variables are ordered after  nonpolicy variables. This procedure implies that 
policy variables are determined based on the knowledge of contemporaneous shocks to output 
and prices, but that output and prices respond to changes in policy variables with a lag. 
Although having known shortcomings, this approach has several advantages.  
 
 First, it provides a basis for characterizing the stylized facts about relationships between 
policy variables and output and prices in Sri Lanka.  
 Second, it requires minimal assumptions about underlying economic relationships, which 
is useful given the uncertainties about the evolving structure of the Sri Lankan economy 
in the  post-conflict period. No a priori presumption as to which variables have more 
influence on output and prices is made and hence all three measures of monetary policy 
tools (money supply, interest rate, and exchange rate) are included in the VAR.  
The baseline VAR model above is estimated using the following five variables from 2000Q1 
and 2013Q3: output, prices, money supply, interest rates, and exchange rates expressed in levels 
or first-differences of the variables inferred from stationarity tests (Annex I, Table 2).  
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In addition, to accommodate uncertainty about the correct order of integration, we use the 
modifications of the Granger-causality test proposed by Toda and Yamamoto (1995), which are 
robust to the order of integration of the variables. Specifically, suppose that we assume the true 
lag length of the VAR to be p; the standard Granger method tests the hypothesis that lags 1 
through p of the ith variable are jointly insignificant in the equation for the jth variable. The 
Toda–Yamamoto test makes use of the fact that, although the order of integration of the 
endogenous variables may be uncertain, the upper bound is usually known. Taking the 
maximum order of integration of the variables in the VAR to be k, the Toda–Yamamoto test 
estimates a VAR with p + k lags and then tests whether the first p lags of the variable i are 
significant in the jth equation. As with the standard Granger-causality tests, the test statistic has 
a χ2 asymptotic distribution but the disadvantage is that including the k additional lags of the 
endogenous variables reduces the power of the test. 
 
Whereas the Toda-Yamamoto tests provide a scalar measure of the significance of policy 
variables in predicting movements in output and prices, the direction and timing of effects can 
be characterized using impulse response functions computed from VAR models. We follow the 
approach discussed in detail by Christiano  and others (1999). We estimate a reduced-form VAR 
and identify monetary policy shocks through assumptions about variable ordering. Formally, the 
reduced- form VAR is written as:  
 
Yt (1) = A0 +A1Yt−1 +· · ·+AkYt−k +ut 
 
where Yt is a vector of policy and  nonpolicy variables, A0 is a vector of constants, At−j is a 
matrix of coefficients on variables lagged j periods, ut is a vector of serially uncorrelated 
disturbances that have mean zero and variance–covariance matrix ∑ 	ଶ௎, and k is the number of 
lags. Because this is a reduced-form representation of a structural model in which some 
variables may affect others contemporaneously, the error terms are composites of underlying 
shocks to variables in the system according to the following specification:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As an example, the time-t innovation to a monetary policy variable, ut, reflects not only the 
exogenous shock to that variable, εit , but it may also include adjustments made in response to 
contemporaneous exogenous shocks to other variables in the system. To identify the underlying 
shocks to monetary policy, the matrix θ is assumed to be lower triangular, that is, by the 
Choleski decomposition, and policy variables are ordered in the VAR after nonpolicy variables. 
The ordering of the policy variables goes as follows: money supply is ordered first followed by 
policy rate and exchange rate to reflect their respective likely degrees of endogeneity to 
economic conditions in Sri Lanka. We also experimented with alternative orderings and 
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replaced broad money with reserve money definitions with the sensitivities explained in Section 
V. 
 
V.   BASELINE VAR AND CHANNELS OF MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION 
A.   Interest Rate Channel (Money View) 
According to the money view, the reduction of the money supply by the authorities (and 
increasing the policy rate) reduces investment and hence output. The interest rate channel affects 
firms’ spending on investment through the cost of capital and household spending on durable 
goods.11 The change in interest rate also affects aggregate demand through the intertemporal 
profile of household consumption, which depends on the degree of intertemporal substitution in 
consumption and the prevalence of credit rationing in the financial system. The strength of this 
channel depends on a correctly aligned expectation mechanism and, therefore,  a normal yield 
curve, as well as on the speed of adjustment of long-term yields to changes in the short-term 
interest rates. These links were tested as shown below. 
 
The policy rate has significant predictive value for output in Sri Lanka, and money supply 
weakly Granger-causes (helps predict) prices (Table 6).12 Output declines by about 0.6 percent 
in the second quarter and by about 0.5 percent during the entire period of nearly three years after 
innovations to the repo rate.13 The repo rate effect on prices—of about 0.2 percent—is through 
the money market rate though with a lagged response embedded in the nominal interest rate 
(price puzzle).14 Policy variables jointly have significant predictive value for both output and 
prices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 Mishra, Montiel, and Spilimbergo (2010). 
12 Using market repo rates in lieu of announced repo rates for the period from 2004Q3  to 2013Q3, where the data 
for money market repo rates  were available, does not reduce the impact of the interest rate channel though 
significantly increases the impact of direct money supply on output versus the policy rate itself.   
13 Including the U.S. refinancing rate in the model reduces the impact of the policy rate on output by about 
0.2 percentage point, making the total impact 0.3 percent during the  three-year period.  
14 We have also run the baseline VAR with core inflation (data  are available from 2003Q1 to 2013Q3)  as the 
weight of food in the consumer price index  (CPI) is about 41 percent and our results did not differ significantly. 
Our tests also show that an oil price shock has a significant impact on inflation. In particular, a one percent shock to 
the oil price will increase the price level by about 0.9 percent within 10 quarters.  
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The variance decomposition shows that almost 6 percent of the change in GDP is explained by 
the variance in the policy rate within a three-year period. For inflation, the money supply 
explains about 4 percent of fluctuations and the rest is explained by inflation inertia.  
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Granger causalities
Sri Lanka
Impact on output
F-stat p-values
Money supply 1/ 0.32 0.57
Interest rate (repo) 11.78*** 0.00
Exchange rate 0.09 0.77
Policy variables jointly 7.72*** 0.00
Impact on prices
F-stat p-values
Money supply 1/ 4.79** 0.03
Interest rate (repo) 2.44 0.13
Exchange rate 1.66 0.20
Policy variables jointly 5.92*** 0.00
p values show the significance of lagged monetary policy variables for output and prices
F statistic at (1, 47)
Critical values are 7.17 at 1% level; 4.03 at 5% level and 2.76 at 10% level
***significant at 1%
**significant at 5%
*significant at 10%
Notes.(i) The optimal lag is selected based on LR=1
F statistic for joint significance is at (4, 48)
Critical values are 3.72 at 1% level, 2.56 at 5% level and 2.01 at 10% level
1/ Defined as broad money (M2b). We have retested the model with reserve money 
and the significance of the repo rate affecting output fades away.
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Table 6. Sri Lanka: Baseline Model
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B.   Bank Lending Channel (Component of the Credit View) 
The bank lending channel (proxied by the lending rates and private credit) is a contributing 
channel to the traditional money view. It can be described as banks’ response—by changing the 
supply of loanable funds—to the changes in the supply of funds (deposit base) or changes in the 
policy rate by the monetary authorities. Competition among banks would be expected to cause 
an increased supply of funds to augment the availability of bank credit for bank loan-dependent 
borrowers (the impact on the real economy would depend on the share of firms without 
alternative forms of financing or the substitutability of loans in  investors’ portfolios), who, in 
turn, will increase spending affecting aggregate demand.15  
 
The bank lending channel contributes to policy innovations that affect output, albeit weakly and 
with a significant lag.16 Several observations are worth considering in this model.  
 
 There is weak Granger causality between private credit and output, but a stronger 
relationship between the prime lending rate and output (Tables 7 and 8).17 
 Private credit contributes to the interest rate channel by about 0.2 percent starting in the 
second quarter but only in the model with exchange rates. This means that a policy 
                                                 
15 The bank lending channel is one component of the credit view on which there is a focus in this paper. The general 
credit view also includes the balance sheet channel (or financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke and Gertler 
(1995)) together with the notion of agency problems arising from asymmetric information and costly enforcement 
of contracts in the financial market. The asymmetry of information makes internal finance (i.e, through retained 
earnings) of new investment projects cheaper than external finance. 
16 The effects of policy rates on lending rates and thus the contribution of the bank lending channel can be different 
during monetary policy cycles (tightening and loosening periods). We have run separate tests on these distinct 
periods with no additional insights into our understanding of the impact of the bank lending channel. 
17 We have simulated the same exercise with the weighted average lending rate and the inference was that only the 
prime lending rate has a significant impact on output. 
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tightening will reduce output by 0.7 percent starting from the second quarter when the 
reduction of private credit is also associated with real exchange rate appreciation.  
 The prime rate has a significant Granger effect on output and reduces it by about 
0.1 percent more after about five quarters. Consistent with the results, the variance 
decomposition shows that about 8 percent of GDP shocks are explained by the prime 
lending rate; about 6 percent by the policy rate; and about 7 percent by private credit. 
 There is no Granger causality from either bank credit or the lending rate on core and 
headline inflation in the model for the bank lending channel. Policy variables jointly 
Granger-cause (help predict) both output and prices. We will return to this observation in 
Section VI. 
The effectiveness of the bank lending channel depends also on the speed of pass-through and the 
level of competition. As seen earlier, pass-through is slow in Sri Lanka, which explains the 
initially unstable and lagged impact of lending rates on output. As to why the supply of bank 
loans does not increase in response to rate changes, the arguments usually refer to banks’ ability 
to attract external funds. Further, banks may simply purchase more securities rather than 
undertake higher lending. The degree of competition among banks also determines the response 
of banks’ lending rates to banks’ cost of funds. In a noncompetitive environment banks will not 
pass on their reduced costs of funding to their loan rates18.  
 
                                                 
18 Perera, Wickramanyake and Ralston (2013) show that bank lending channel in Sri Lanka has been recently 
weakened by commercial banks engaging in off-balance sheet lending and other activities (guarantees, 
commitments and derivative transactions such as foreign exchange contracts, forwards, futures and options, swap 
and credit derivatives). In addition, bank lending channel could be weakened by the general lack of trust in state 
banking, and also strong influences of shadow banking activities (personal and tailor made bank lending 
approaches).  
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Granger causalities
Sri Lanka
F-stat p-values
Money supply 1/ 1.21 0.31
Interest rate (repo) 3.18* 0.05
Prime lending rate 2/ 3.58** 0.04
Private credit 2.82* 0.07
Policy variables jointly 3.7*** 0.00
Impact on prices
F-stat p-values
Money supply 1.42 0.25
Interest rate (repo) 2.15 0.13
Prime lending rate 0.77 0.47
Private credit 0.47 0.63
Policy variables jointly 2.64** 0.06
p values show the significance of lagged monetary policy variables for output and prices
F statistic at (2, 40)
Critical values are 5.18 at 1% level; 3.23 at 5% level and 2.44 at 10% level
***significant at 1%
**significant at 5%
*significant at 10%
Notes (i) The optimal lag is selected based on LR=2
F statistic for joint significance is at (10, 41)
Critical values are 2.80 at 1% level, 2.08 at 5% level and 1.70 at 10% level
1/ Tests with reserve money have not changed our findings.
2/ Only the prime lending rate has a Granger effect on output and with the private credit 
variable included in the VAR, the test with weighted average lending and money market rate was not 
significant at any conventional level.
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Impact on output
Table 8. Sri Lanka: Credit Channel
Granger causalities
Sri Lanka
F-stat p-values
Money supply 1/ 1.21 0.31
Interest rate (repo) 3.18* 0.05
Exchange rate 0.15 0.86
Private credit 2.82* 0.07
Policy variables jointly 3.7*** 0.00
Impact on prices
F-stat p-values
Money supply 1/ 1.42 0.25
Interest rate (repo) 2.15 0.13
Exchange rate 0.18 0.84
Private credit 0.47 0.63
Policy variables jointly 2.64** 0.06
p values show the significance of lagged monetary policy variables for output and prices
F statistic at (2, 40)
Critical values are 5.18 at 1% level; 3.23 at 5% level and 2.44 at 10% level
***significant at 1%
**significant at 5%
*significant at 10%
Notes (i) The optimal lag is selected based on LR=2
F statistic for joint significance is at (10, 41)
Critical values are 2.80 at 1% level, 2.08 at 5% level and 1.70 at 10% level
1/ Defined as broad money (M2b). We have retested the model with reserve money 
and with no significant difference in our findings. In addition, the impact of reserve money on 
private credit has proven to be highly significant.
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Impact on output
Table 7. Sri Lanka: Credit Channel
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C.   Exchange Rate Channel 
The exchange rate channel kicks in when policy rate adjustments trigger changes in short- term 
market and lending and deposit rates—including on government securities. Under a floating 
regime and perfect capital mobility, changes in the nominal and (with sticky prices) real 
exchange rates induce expenditure switching between domestic and foreign goods and affect 
aggregate demand through net exports. A number of factors may be limiting the exchange rate 
channel, including: (i) continued management of the exchange rate during periods of volatility 
(i.e., a managed as opposed to free float); (ii) the degree of capital mobility in Sri Lanka is 
limited both jurisdictionally and in practice; (iii) and the growing importance of short-term 
external borrowing and potential currency mismatch with negative expenditure-reduction effects 
offsetting expenditure-switching effects on output.    
 
The exchange rate channel (proxied by the nominal exchange rate, the NEER, and the  real 
effective exchange rate, the REER) is weakly contributing to other channels but has no 
significance on its own.  There is no Granger effect (predicting) of the exchange rate on either 
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output or on prices. However, the presence of the exchange rate in the model with the bank 
lending channel augments its influence on output by about 0.2 percent, and variance 
decomposition shows that about 8 percent of output fluctuations are explained by the changes in 
the exchange rate. Also, the exchange rate responds to changes in short-term rates on 
government bonds.19 The cumulative effect fades after about 4 quarters, and the impact on 
output even sooner.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D.   Asset Price Channel 
The mechanics of the asset price channel (proxied by the stock market index) in the workings of 
the monetary transmission mechanism are as follows: An increase in the policy rate (monetary 
tightening) can reduce equity prices by making equity relatively less attractive compared to 
bonds, as well as worsening the earnings outlook for firms (since household spending declines). 
Lower equity prices lead, in turn, to a drop in financial wealth of both households and firms. 
Hence, households reduce consumption, and for firms, their market value relative to the 
replacement cost of capital declines and this delays new investment (Tobin’s q effect). 
 
                                                 
19 For the exchange rate channel, we have tried several VAR specifications with different interest rates on 
government securities (3, 6, and 12-month Treasury bill rates) and money market rates (overnight call market and 
other money market rates).  The strongest impulse on the REER is received from the model with the 12-month 
Treasury bill rate. 
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The asset price channel (proxied by the index of the Colombo stock exchange) has no 
meaningful impact on output and prices. Previous results where the policy rate had a significant 
impact on output and reduced it by about 0.5 percent during the entire shock period did not 
change with the asset price channel included in the model (Table 9).  
 
 
 
The following chart summarizes the monetary policy transmission dynamics discussed above for 
Sri Lanka (with vertical lines showing that the channel is ineffective). The dashed line for the 
bank lending channel indicates its partial significance in the monetary transmission channel in 
Sri Lanka. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
              
 
Granger causalities
Sri Lanka
F-stat p-values
Money supply 1/ 0.32 0.57
Interest rate (repo) 11.78*** 0.00
Exchange rate 0.09 0.77
Stock market index 0.30 0.59
Policy variables jointly 1.72* 0.19
Impact on prices
F-stat p-values
Money supply 1/ 1.42 0.25
Interest rate (repo) 2.43* 0.12
Exchange rate 1.66 0.20
Stock market index 1.36 0.25
Policy variables jointly 2.23** 0.03
p values show the significance of lagged monetary policy variables for output and prices
F statistic at (2, 40)
Critical values are 5.18 at 1% level; 3.23 at 5% level and 2.44 at 10% level
***significant at 1%
**significant at 5%
*significant at 10%
Notes (i) The optimal lag is selected based on LR=2
F statistic for joint significance is at (10, 41)
Critical values are 2.80 at 1% level, 2.08 at 5% level and 1.70 at 10% level
1/ Defined as broad money (M2b). We have retested the model with reserve money 
and with no significant difference in our findings.
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Impact on output
Table 9. Sri Lanka: Asset Price Channel
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VI.   MORE ON THE CHANNELS OF MONETARY POLICY TRANSMISSION 
Exogeneity tests provide further evidence on the impact and timing of various transmission 
channels. In this section, we assess the impact of various channels on output and prices using the 
approach suggested by Ramey (1993) and Disyatat and Vongsinsirikul (2003). In particular, 
each monetary policy channel is evaluated with, and without, being endogenized for the baseline 
period of study from 2000Q1 to 2013Q3.20 The output and price responses are evaluated with 
each channel blocked off in the VAR and compared when it is part of the model. The IRFs of 
both models are plotted below with the differences indicating the strength of each channel. The 
interest rate channel is compared with all other channels combined. The results are as follows: 
(i) the strongest monetary policy channel in Sri Lanka is the interest rate channel; (ii) the bank 
lending channel is operational on its impact on output (5 quarters) and prices (5–10 quarters) but 
with a significant lag. The contribution of the bank lending channel to the policy rate in 
affecting inflation is strongest among all other channels (note that we did not have these results 
with the Granger effect in Section V, B). This observation on the timing also echoes earlier 
results of a longer- term convergence of policy rates and money market and other interest rates.  
 
 
 
                                                 
20 The exercise also covers the period from 1995Q1 to 2013Q3 with no major differences in the results. 
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VII.   VAR MODEL—ISSUE OF EXCESS LIQUIDITY, OUTPUT, AND INFLATION 
The securitization of bank portfolios could be a drag on monetary policy transmission, and the 
impact of Treasury bill rates on inflation is much stronger than the role of the policy rate. Two 
expanded VAR models are used to assess these assumptions21. They include real GDP, the CPI, 
the money supply (alternating with reserve money), policy interest rate, outstanding deposits (in 
the first model, Table 10) and securities in the banking system (in the second model, Table 11), 
the 12-month Treasury bill rate, the exchange rate, and private credit. 
  
The impact of policy rates on output can be dampened when the bank lending channel becomes 
muted and the impulses from policy rates land in the securities market. The interesting 
confirmation of this result is the significant Granger effect of the policy rate when deposits are 
available, and the lack of any Granger effect from the policy rate (although money supply still 
weakly Granger-causes (helps predict) output) without deposits in the model. More importantly, 
the 12-month Treasury bill rates Granger-cause (help predict) prices (a one percent reduction in 
the 12-month Treasury bill rate will increase prices by about 0.2 percent within two quarters). 
This is an important observation as any purchase of securities by banks will, in effect, increase 
liquidity.   
 
Consistent with the results, 20 percent of variance in GDP and inflation is explained by the 
changes in the money supply (12 percent) and 12-month Treasury bill rate (8 percent). 
Interestingly, given (i) the longer convergence between the changes in the policy and other rates, 
and the fact that (ii) Treasury bill and money market rates significantly affect inflation, and (iii) 
that the bank lending channel is important for price formation (as shown in Section VI), it can 
be inferred that the impact of policy rates or money supply on inflation is not observable until 
the later periods when all rates converge. 
 
                                                 
21 These models (together with the expanded models including stock market index) are also estimated to ensure that 
our estimates do not suffer from omitted variable bias. Our results did not change with all policy variables 
simultaneously included in those models.  
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VIII.   CONCLUSIONS 
The interest rate channel is the most important monetary policy transmission channel in Sri 
Lanka as it directly affects the decision making of economic agents. However, the roles of bank 
lending and the exchange rate and asset price channels should be strengthened going forward. 
Our results showed that each of these channels, if fully operational, can significantly contribute 
to the effectiveness of the monetary policy transmission mechanism in Sri Lanka. For example, 
the bank lending channel adds another 0.2 percentage point to the baseline 0.5 percent decrease 
in output in response to innovations in the policy rate. Also, the contribution of the exchange 
rate channel through real appreciation in the model with private credit causes an additional 
0.2 percent reduction of output to the increase in the policy rate. 
-.02
-.01
.00
.01
.02
.03
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Accumulated Response of Prices (CPI) to One Percent Change in the 12 months T bill rate
Granger causalities
Sri Lanka
Impact on output Impact of policy rate on
F-stat p-values
Money supply 1/ 1.21 0.31
Interest rate (repo) 3.18* 0.05
Exchange rate 0.15 0.86
Securities 0.20 0.82 0.21 0.81
Private credit 2.82* 0.07 1.89 0.16
Deposits 0.93 0.40 0.02 0.98
Policy variables jointly 1.62 0.12
Impact on prices
F-stat p-values
Money supply 1/ 1.42 0.25
Interest rate (repo) 2.15 0.13
Exchange rate 0.18 0.84
Securities 1.63 0.21
Private credit 0.47 0.63
Deposits 0.13 0.88
Policy variables jointly 1.57 0.13
p values show the significance of lagged monetary policy variables for output and prices
F statistic at (2, 36)
Critical values are 5.28 at 1% level; 3.26 at 5% level and 2.46 at 10% level
***significant at 1%
**significant at 5%
*significant at 10%
Notes (i) The optimal lag is selected based on LR=2
F statistic for joint significance is at (14, 37)
Critical values are 2.62 at 1% level, 1.97 at 5% level and 1.69 at 10% level
1/ Defined as broad money (M2b). We have retested the model with reserve money 
and with no significant difference in our findings.
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Table 10. Sri Lanka: Expanded VAR Model
Granger causalities
Sri Lanka
Impact on output Impact of policy rate on
F-stat p-values
Money supply 1/ 3.08** 0.04
Interest rate (repo) 1.47 0.24
Exchange rate 0.78 0.51
Securities 0.36 0.78  2.04 0.12
Private credit 2.12 0.11  1.51 0.23
Twelve-month Treasury bill 12 0.41 0.75  5.85*** 0.00
Policy variables jointly 3.22*** 0.01
Impact on prices
F-stat p-values
Money supply 1/ 0.97 0.41
Interest rate (repo) 2.32* 0.09
Exchange rate 0.51 0.68
Private credit 1.32 0.28
Twelve-month Treasury bill 12 4.08** 0.01
Policy variables jointly 2.82*** 0.01
p values show the significance of lagged monetary policy variables for output and prices
F statistic at (3, 28)
Critical values are 4.57 at 1% level; 2.95 at 5% level and 2.29 at 10% level
***significant at 1%
**significant at 5%
*significant at 10%
Notes (i) The optimal lag is selected based on LR=3
F statistic for joint significance is at (21, 29)
Critical values are 2.58 at 1% level, 1.95 at 5% level and 1.69 at 10% level
1/ Defined as broad money (M2b). We have retested the model with reserve money 
and with no significant difference in our findings.
Source: IMF staff calculations.
Table 11. Sri Lanka: Expanded VAR Model with 12-Month Treasury Bill Rate
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To address the weakness of the bank lending channel, as well as to increase the short- run pass-
through between the policy rates and market and lending rates, a more competitive banking 
system should be encouraged. Some potential measures in this regard include: (i) developing 
alternative sources of financing, such as the capital market; (ii) reducing the role of state banks 
in the financial system to avoid the pitfalls associated with state banking including lack of trust 
in transparency; and (iii) creating avenues to connect bank financing with the real economy. 
 
To bring forward the exchange rate channel, the authorities need to limit the interventions in the 
foreign exchange market to focus on smoothing excessive fluctuations and allow flexibility to 
Sri Lankan rupee.  Together with this, the authorities could gradually increase the degree of 
capital mobility and allow more transparent and active foreign participation in domestic 
secondary securities and deposit markets. This is given Sri Lankan circumstances and progress 
towards maintaining macroeconomic and financial stability. The further development of a 
competitive export base would significantly increase the value added of the exchange rate 
channel.  
 
To make the asset channel operational, the authorities should adopt necessary institutional 
reforms to increase the transparency and entry into equity and property markets for both 
residents and nonresidents. As economic agents participate more actively in the asset markets, 
and nonbanking assets grow as a proportion of their total wealth, dependence on bank financing 
may decrease. Allowing the asset price channel to work will enhance the market allocation of 
wealth and sustain the efficiency of the transmission mechanism. 
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Annex I. Data Generation Process and Unit Root Test Results 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
CMR St
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3* Model 1* Model 2 Model 3
AIC -1.87 -1.87 -1.91 AIC -0.94 -0.94 -0.93
Schwarz -1.68 -1.60 -1.68 Schwarz -0.90 -0.83 -0.86
SSR 0.38 0.34 0.34 SSR 1.19 1.10 1.15
Q(4) 2/ 1.4126 (0.842) 1.0177 (0.907) 1.0197 (0.907) Q(4) 1.6142 (0.806) 2.6787 (0.613) 1.7144 (0.788)
Q(8) 2.7547 (0.949) 2.2557 (0.972) 2.2585 (0.972) Q(8) 10.109 (0.257) 11.81 (0.16) 10.29 (0.245)
Q(12) 9.2318 (0.683) 5.0018 (0.958) 4.9933 (0.958) Q(12) 11.728 (0.468) 14.743 (0.256) 11.824 (0.46)
Model 1 No Constant No trend Model 1 No Constant No trend
Model 2 Constant and a trend Model 2 Constant and a trend
Model 3 Constant Model 3 Constant
1/ Model selected for unit root testing.
2/ Q(p)=Ljung Box Statistics for the residuals (significance level in parentheses).
Table 1: Sri Lanka: Models Describing the DGP(Data Generating Processes) for Series 1/
Tb Lending Rate
Model 1 Model 2* Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3*
AIC -1.14 -1.49 -1.23 AIC -2.64 -2.77 -2.80
Schwarz -1.11 -1.26 -1.08 Schwarz -2.53 -2.58 -2.65
SSR 0.97 0.55 0.76 SRR 0.20 0.16 0.16
Q(4) 3.0563 (0.548) 2.1344 (0.711) 3.0489 (0.55) Q(4) 2.0276 (0.731) 3.8554 (0.426) 3.5322 (0.473)
Q(8) 5.081 (0.749) 2.4063 (0.966) 3.76 (0.878) Q(8) 3.1467 (0.925) 4.9978 (0.758) 4.6849 (0.791)
Q(12) 13.007 (0.369) 5.0071 (0.958) 8.2366 (0.766) Q(12) 12.679 (0.393) 12.108 (0.437) 11.631 (0.476)
Model 1 No Constant No trend Model 1 No Constant No trend
Model 2 Constant and a trend Model 2 Constant and a trend
Model 3 Constant Model 3 Constant
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RGDP CPI
Model 1 Model 2* Model 3 Model 1* Model 2 Model 3
AIC -4.85 -5.45 -4.76 AIC -5.54 -5.56 -5.54
Schwarz -4.66 -5.22 -4.57 Schwarz -5.43 -5.38 -5.40
SRR 0.02 0.01 0.02 SRR 0.01 0.01 0.01
Q(4) 7.848 (0.097) 2.5749 (0.631) 5.2976 (0.258) Q(4) 0.1719 (0.997) 0.3087 (0.989) 0.1684 (0.997)
Q(8) 9.2501 (0.322) 5.965 (0.651) 6.1192 (0.634) Q(8) 1.6826 (0.989) 1.9903 (0.981) 1.7181 (0.988)
Q(12) 10.435 (0.578) 11.392 (0.496) 8.9362 (0.708) Q(12) 2.7618 (0.997) 2.8336 (0.997) 2.9844 (0.996)
Model 1 No Constant No trend Model 1 No Constant No trend
Model 2 Constant and a trend Model 2 Constant and a trend
Model 3 Constant Model 3 Constant
M2 REER
Model 1 Model 2* Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3*
AIC -5.88 -5.93 -5.78 AIC -4.77 -4.68 -5.01
Schwarz -5.76 -5.74 -5.71 Schwarz -4.65 -4.53 -4.79
SRR 0.01 0.01 0.01 SSR 0.02 0.02 0.02
Q(4) 1.673 (0.796) 2.5409 (0.637) 0.0487 (1) Q(4) 7.4055 (0.116) 13.086 (0.011) 8.2049 (0.084)
Q(8) 2.41 (0.966) 3.9084 (0.865) 1.0285 (0.998) Q(8) 13.814 (0.087) 21.42 (0.006) 12.722 (0.122)
Q(12) 4.0102 (0.983) 5.952 (0.918) 2.8395 (0.997) Q(12) 18.605 (0.099) 32.601 (0.001) 18.037(0.115)
Model 1 No Constant No trend Model 1 No Constant No trend
Model 2 Constant and a trend Model 2 Constant and a trend
Model 3 Constant Model 3 Constant
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U.S. Rate Repo
Model 1 Model 2* Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3*
AIC 0.29308 0.08 0.10 AIC -2.77 -2.76 -2.78
Schwarz 0.09 0.23 0.22 Schwarz -2.66 -2.57 -2.63
SRR 3.16 2.89715 3.077673 SRR 0.17 0.16 0.16
Q(4) 6.4921 (0.165) 3.4203 (0.49) 5.317 (0.256) Q(4) 1.8277 (0.767) 1.1134 (0.892)1.4296 (0.839)
Q(8) 8.3156 (0.403) 7.4026 (0.494) 8.6199 (0.375) Q(8) 7.9156 (0.442) 7.6182 (0.472)7.7391 (0.459)
Q(12) 18.95 (0.09) 15.103 (0.236) 15.155 (0.233) Q(12) 18.297 (0.107) 17.454 (0.133)17.073 (0.147)
Model 1 No Constant No trend Model 1 No Constant No trend
Model 2 Constant and a trend Model 2 Constant and a trend
Model 3 Constant Model 3 Constant
CP OP
Model 1 Model 2* Model 3 Model 1 Model 2* Model 3
AIC -2.98 -3.10 -2.97 AIC -1.10 -1.17 -1.08
Schwarz -2.87 -2.91 -2.82 Schwarz -0.99 -0.98 -0.93
SRR 0.14 0.12 0.14 SRR 0.90 0.78 0.88
Q(4) 1.9508 (0.745) 0.4422 (0.979) 1.8245 (0.768) Q(4) 1.8856 (0.757) 1.0923 (0.895) 1.6298 (0.803)
Q(8) 8.3537 (0.4) 6.25 (0.619) 7.9068 (0.443) Q(8) 4.9434 (0.764) 3.2166 (0.92) 4.7188 (0.787)
Q(12) 12.135 (0.435) 7.7468 (0.805) 11.43 (0.493) Q(12) 5.0939 (0.955) 3.4994 (0.991) 4.8877 (0.962)
Model 1 No Constant No trend Model 1 No Constant No trend
Model 2 Constant and a trend Model 2 Constant and a trend
Model 3 Constant Model 3 Constant
SEC DEP
Model 1* Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2* Model 3
AIC -0.23 -0.22 -0.19 AIC -4.76 -4.84 -4.78
Schwarz -0.12 -0.03 -0.04 Schwarz -4.69 -4.69 -4.67
SRR 2.15 2.02 2.15 SRR 0.02 0.02 0.02
Q(4) 0.1623 (0.997) 0.1995 (0.995) 0.1506 (0.997) Q(4) 0.3822 (0.984) 0.3923 (0.983) 0.3046 (0.990)
Q(8) 0.8043 (0.999) 0.9417 (0.999) 0.7696 (0.999) Q(8) 3.0582 (0.931) 4.0383 (0.854)  3.7179 (0.882)
Q(12) 0.8043 (0.994) 3.5576 (0.990) 2.9789 (0.996) Q(12) 3.2541 (0.993) 4.8144 (0.964) 4.4048 (0.975)
Model 1 No Constant No trend Model 1 No Constant No trend
Model 2 Constant and a trend Model 2 Constant and a trend
Model 3 Constant Model 3 Constant
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Deposit rate
Model 1 Model 2* Model 3
AIC -3.47 -3.86 -3.66
Schwarz -3.32 -3.60 -3.43
SRR 0.08 0.03 0.06
Q(4) 1.1187 (0.891) 0.5215 (0.971) 1.0833 (0.897)
Q(8) 3.7899 (0.876) 3.469 (0.902) 1.9544 (0.982)
Q(12) 12.689 (0.392) 10.383 (0.582) 7.5748 (0.817)
Model 1 No Constant No trend
Model 2 Constant and a trend
Model 3 Constant
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Is the series stationary? 1/ 2/
Should the 
series be 
differenced 
in the 
analysis?
Series
ADF PP 3/ NP KPSS 4/ ERS P-break 5/
Interest rate (repo) No No No No Yes No Yes
M2 No No No No Yes No Yes
Exchange rate No No No No Yes No Yes
Real GDP Yes No No No Yes Yes Yes
CPI 6/ Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A No No
Lending rate Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes
Twelve-month Treasury bill rate No No No Yes Yes No Yes
Call market rate Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes
Private Credit Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes
Stock market index Yes Yes N/A N/A N/A No No
U.S. refinancing rate No No No No Yes No Yes
Oil Price No No No Yes Yes No Yes
Securities No No N/A N/A N/A No Yes
Deposits No No No Yes Yes No Yes
Deposit rate No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
1/ ADF-Augmented Dickey-Fuller. PP=Phillips-Perron. ERS=DF-GLS by the method of Elliot, Rothenberg, and Stock.
NP=Ng-Perron.P-break=Perron's test allowing for structural break. KPSS=Kwiatkowski, Phillips,Schmidt and Shin
2/ Significance is tested at 5% level
3/ MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values are reported for PP statistics 
4/ In all tests the null hypothesis is the unit root of the series except in KPSS where stationarity of series is the null
5/The critical values for Perron's test are taken from Perron (1989) p. 1376-1377: λ is taken for Model C at 5% significance level 
The critical values for t when λ=0.7 are -4.75 at 1% level; -4.18 at 5% level and -3.86 at 10% level.
6/ Our test results show that the variable for CPI is stationary and thus should not be differenced in the model. 
We have also taken a conservatve approach and run the VAR models with differnecd CPI.
7/In the paper, a conservative approach is taken and the VAR tests are run with differenced CPI and interest rates in levels.
Table 2. Sri Lanka: Summary of the Results of Stationarity Tests
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Mean Median Maximum Minimum
Standard 
Deviation
Repo rate 9.444 8.58 19.33 7 2.776
Three-month T-bill rate 11.32 10.1 21.3 6.98 3.892
Twelve-month T-bill rate 11.882 11.17 20.21 7.14 3.891
Prime rate 13.69 12.8 22.24 8.94 3.762
∆ CPI 0.024 0.021 0.065 -0.021 0.017
∆ Real GDP 0.013 0.01 0.087 -0.105 0.031
∆ Reserve money 0.029 0.029 0.095 -0.079 0.031
∆ Broad money 0.037 0.038 0.07 0.001 0.013
∆ Overall credit 0.038 0.044 0.124 -0.135 0.04
∆ Private credit 0.037 0.04 0.107 -0.025 0.027
Sources: Sri Lankan authorities; and IMF staff estimates.
Note: ∆ denotes the quarter-on-quarter difference in the logarithm of the variables (seasonally 
adjusted). The sample covers 2000Q1 to 2013Q3.
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of Selected Variables, 2000Q1 to 2013Q3
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Annex II. Comparison with Previous Work 
 
Our findings are broadly in line with the previous work on the monetary transmission 
mechanism in Sri Lanka except for the conclusions on the impact of policy innovations on 
inflation.  Previous studies (Perera and Wickramanayake (2013); Fernandez and others (2004) 
have showed that interest rate and credit channels—whereby the central bank’s monetary 
decision influences economic activities through its policy rate and, hence, through the market 
and lending interest rates--are the dominant monetary policy channels in Sri Lanka with IMF 
Fernandez and others (2004) downplaying the relative importance of the bank lending channel. 
We agree with this and we believe that the investment channel whereby the policy rates affect 
the decision-making process of the economic agents is the strongest channel in Sri Lanka.  
 
On the other hand, the importance of the monetary shocks in affecting inflation has been 
controversial. Fernandez and others (2004) showed that “shocks to output and inflation (roughly 
in equal proportion) explain most of its variability rather than monetary shocks.” The lack of a 
high impact of policy measures on prices is explained by the higher weight of food in the price 
index and inflation inertia - the latter by the backward-looking wage formation in the 
government sector.  With a larger sample (from 1995 to 2013) (Perera and Wickramanayake 
(2013) found prices to be responsive to monetary shocks though the presence of “price puzzle” 
overshadowed true inference on how prices respond to monetary shocks. We encountered this 
problem too. Ratnasiri (2009) found that money growth has effects on inflation in the long run 
but the output gap has no significance in explaining inflation.  
 
In our paper, we found no difference between the results with CPI and core inflation. Second, 
we found that money growth does, in fact, weakly Granger-cause (helps predict) inflation and, 
in the expanded model with securities and  Treasury bill rates, 20 percent of inflation is 
explained by changes in money growth and Treasury bill rates.  
 
Finally, based on our initial results of exogeneity tests on the bank lending channel and the 
significant impact of  Treasury bill and money market rates on inflation, we believe that the 
banks’ behavior in responding to policy signals can alter the direction of these signals from 
output to inflation. In particular, banks may be tempted to neutralize any policy action by 
counteractive transactions in the government securities market thereby affecting inflation 
dynamics in Sri Lanka. Having said this, it is also possible that, owing to the slow adjustment of 
money and other rates to changes in the policy rates, the long -run impact on inflation is visible 
only through those rates rather than directly from the policy variables; the previous studies, 
which did not examine the timing effects of rate convergence, did not raise this possibility. The 
fact that the Sri Lankan authorities are keen to investigate these pass-through channels between 
policy and money market rates is welcome. 
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